Introduction
The objective of this article is to elaborate a simplifi ed methodological tool for evaluation of the social effi ciency of core-periphery free market behaviour and the need for public intervention. Here we use the broad defi nition of 'core' as a region with the greatest concentration of economic activity and generally also of population (in terms of product or employment per area or density of population).
optimum is defined as the optimum for society as a whole and includes considerations of costs and benefi ts for society beyond those perceived by the private investors, and resulting from the concentration of economic activity. These may include costs such as increasing public infrastructure expenses or benefi ts such as external positive economies. We also take into consideration the fact that public intervention also involves costs.
The natural tendency of spatial concentration has been analysed and investigated by many scholars, generally under the global title of the 'core-periphery' issue. However, most research is oriented towards understanding free market behaviour, sometimes including the infl uence of the public sector as one of the actors. In a recent article, Bar-El and Schwartz (2006) summarised some of this research. Krugman (1991) established a signifi cant starting-point with the development of a rather simplifi ed model to explain the geographical concentration of manufacturing. He explains, using a two-region/ two-sector model, how a concentration of manufacturing activity may be found in one region, depending on the interaction among three main parameters: the share of manufacturing in the economy, the existence of economies of scale and the level of transport costs. This core-periphery (CP) model implies that economic effi ciency considerations lead to a heavy concentration of the population around the manufacturing activity in one region (core), while the second region (periphery) will be less populated and based on agricultural activity.
Further developments of Krugman's model, mainly changing some basic assumptions, have led others to different conclusions. Lanaspa et al. (2001a) found that assuming the existence of congestion costs and abandoning the assumption of constant transport costs led (using the same basis as Krugman's CP model) to the existence of various asymmetric stable equilibria, thereby providing a "theoretical justifi cation for economic landscapes in which large industrial belts co-exist with smaller ones" (Lanaspa et al., 2001a, p. 437) . We can state that the theoretical structure established by Krugman may justify a concentration of manufacturing activity, but, under different assumptions and parameters, may also explain simultaneous growth in various regions. Krugman himself explains in a later article (Krugman, 1999 ) the action of 'centrifugal' and 'centripetal' forces that may lead to the concentration of economic activity in more than one place. The co-existence of multiple locations of economic growth has been justifi ed by other factors: physical capital mobility (Forslid, 1999) , the decreasing cost of trading ideas (Baldwin and Forslid, 2000) , the differing qualities of land (Lanaspa and Sanz, 1999) , the infl uence of the public sector (Lanaspa et al., 2001b; Bar-El and Parr, 2003) and specifi cally tax differentials (Borck and Pfl üger, 2005) . Challenging the coreperiphery model has led to the development of alternative models (Copus, 2001; Fishman and Simhon, 2002; Hu, 2002) .
In Krugman's model, as well as in research that extended this model, no distinction is made between the free market solution and the social optimum. A model that enables the identification of a social optimum would naturally be much more complicated than a model for the identifi cation of a private optimum. Social optimum may be viewed in terms of the total welfare of the population as a whole. An exact measure would be diffi cult to achieve since it would require quantitative parameters, such as the infl uences of externalities (both positive and negative), as well as much more qualitative or ideologyoriented parameters, such as the value of equality or marginal utilities of income. Efforts to evaluate such a social optimum have therefore been quite restricted in the literature, or have focused on specifi c issues. Dohse (1998), Fujita and Abdel-Rahman (1993) and Helsley and Strange (1990) refer to the market failure that stems from firms' failure to consider the positive externalities (the marginal infl uence on the agglomeration advantage) and the negative externalities (the marginal infl uence on the free market prices), yet these models do not refer to the extra social costs. Ottaviano and Thisse (2001) relate to the externalities created by the workers through the price of the goods in each region (pecuniary externalities). In another article (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2002) they found, in the context of the EU integration process, that at given costs of factor mobility, free market agglomeration would not lead to maximum effi ciency. This leads them to the conclusion that it would be more effi cient to impose restrictions on factor mobility (this would, for example, prevent a 'brain drain' from poorer regions). Charlot et al. (2006) also address the welfare properties of market allocations in new economic geography models; they add the element of societal values and reach the general conclusion that the market equilibrium may not coincide with the social optimum. Still, the existence of a gap between the free market optimum and the social optimum does not automatically justify government interference. For example, the cost of intervention might be greater than the additional welfare gained by the policy. Charlot et al. (2006) found that interregional transfers may be the better solution for correcting the discrepancies arising in a core-periphery structure, since it seems problematic for the government to undertake a major reorganisation of the spatial patterns of economic activities. The same concern was raised by Knarvik (2004) , who also suggests taking into consideration intraindustry and interindustry knowledge spillovers, as well as trade costs.
Our intention in this article is to create a link between the private considerations and social consideration in one model, being aware of the cost of having to consider only measurable elements of the social aspects. We intend to construct a general simplifi ed model that includes both the free market considerations that lead to the distribution of economic activity between regions and the social considerations (in terms of economic infl uences on the society as a whole) that may lead to a different distribution. We examine the spatial distribution of fi rms under free market conditions, compare it with the distribution that would lead to a social optimum and examine the type of public policy required to lead the economy towards the optimal distribution. Further, we check the extent to which the increase in social benefi t justifi es the cost of public intervention.
The Model
The model elaborated here focuses on the process of decision-making at the private level, in terms of selecting a location for investment in economic activity to achieve maximum business benefits, and further focuses on the implications such a process may have for the social benefits or costs. This is an oversimplifi ed model in the sense that it does not consider all factors that may infl uence such decision-making, but rather focuses on those that refl ect the difference between private business considerations and public considerations.
The Basic Model
We assume that the objective of the public sector is to maximise welfare-W. For the sake of simplifi cation, we assume the existence of only two regions j: A is a core region (defi ned as a region with a high level of economic activity) and B is a peripheral region. We take this situation as given, in the sense that we do not initially refer to the reasons that led A to be a core region.
The number of fi rms in region j is n j . Here, the number of fi rms actually stands for the level of economic activity. At the starting-point n A > n B . The objective of the fi rm when making a decision to locate in region A or in region B is to maximise the private NPV: NPV j private is the net present value the fi rm sees under free market conditions, taking into consideration all private benefi ts versus all private costs.
For analytical purposes, let us make the simplistic assumption that NPV can be disaggregated in two parts, one determined by the technological specifi c factors of the fi rm or the sector, and the other dependent on location factors: NPV basic is the part of NPV that does not depend on the region in which the fi rm locates and is determined by the specific characteristics of the firm or the sector, such as production technology and production factors. Given that NPV basic is identical for both regions, the fi rm will want to maximise the following expression
where, the ZP j is the private 'score' of region j for a specifi c fi rm.
We normalise the value of each X ji in region B to one, so that the value of the variable in region A refl ects the relative advantage of region A for each of the variables. The next step is to identify the main variables that infl uence the location of economic activity. If we summarise the results of the research studies conducted by Henderson (1983 Henderson ( , 1986 , Roberts (1985) , Bar-El and Felsenstein (1990) , Taylor (1993) , Wong (1998) , Mano and Otsuka (2000) and Hodgkinson and Pomfret (2001) , we can see that most location factors can be classifi ed into fi ve main broad variables
(1) PE: agglomeration economies (expressing factors such as proximity to other fi rms, proximity to suppliers and services). It is clear that the classifi cation of these three factors as exogenous is almost arbitrary, but is necessary for well-known technical reasons. The level of infrastructure (INF) is exogenously determined by the government, but public decisions about this are certainly infl uenced by the level of economic activity in each region. The labour force variable (LF) is also infl uenced by the level of economic activity in each region and this issue is broadly covered in the extensive literature on migration and labour force commuting. However, for the sake of simplicity, here we assume this variable to be exogenous. Its inclusion as an endogenous variable requires another dimension in this model and justifi es a separate article (under preparation).
The endogenous variable PE. Agglomeration economies are defi ned by Isard (1956) as scale economies that are external to the fi rm and internal to the city or the region. They include localisation and urbanisation economies, as analysed by Catin (1991) . It has been shown in the literature that an increase in the number of fi rms in a region increases agglomeration economies and therefore increases the productivity of each fi rm in the region (Segal, 1976; Arnott, 1979; Henderson, 1983 Henderson, , 1986 Nakamura, 1985; Goldstein and Gronberg, 1986; Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Davis and Weinstein, 1999) . We express the relationship between the number of fi rms and agglomeration economies by the equation
and
where, MPE j is the marginal productivity of the positive agglomeration effect. We further assume that there is an 'agglomeration diseconomies' effect. The existence of such diseconomies after the achievement of a certain level of agglomeration is quite widely recognised. Illeris (1993) , for example, explains the limitations of the theory of polarisation between the centre and the periphery, and suggests an inductive theory to explain the development of various regions as a function of their specifi c characteristics. We integrate this effect in our model by assuming that the marginal productivity decreases
The normalised value of PE in region A (as noted, region B values are set equal to one) is
We can express the PE function as
where, α is the elasticity of the agglomeration advantage in relation to the number of fi rms; and λ is a positive coeffi cient. The relative 'score' of region A is therefore
The endogenous variable PP. As the number of fi rms in the region increases, the prices of production factors are generally expected to increase as a consequence of increasing demand, the immobility of some production factors, such as land, and the assumed not-total mobility of other factors such as labour (Mera, 1973; Conrad, 1997; Mitra, 1999; Verhoef, 2000) .
where, MPP j is the increase in prices that results from an increase in the number of fi rms in the region. We assume that prices increase at a growing rate
Let us assume that the PP function is
where, β p is the elasticity of prices in relation to the number of fi rms, defi ned as the percentage change in price in relation to the change in the number of fi rms; and ω is a positive coeffi cient. The relative 'score' of Region A is therefore
The score of each region can be now formulated as
where, const 
Free Market Solution
Lemma 1. In a system with two regions, A and B, the free market will lead to a fi nite ratio y, where
We assume a better starting-point for the core region A: it enjoys more economic activity and better values for its exogenous variables 
Given the characteristics of α and β, these functions would behave as in Figure 1 , showing that until point R, the score for region A rises, indicating a faster growth of the advantage of agglomeration over the disadvantage of increasing prices. From point R to point S, the relative advantage of region A decreases, but still persists, so that it is benefi cial for fi rms to locate in region A. In the free market, the proportion of the number of fi rms in regions A and B is determined by the proportion y p . That ratio represents a stable system equilibrium (every shift from it will create an advantage for one of the regions so the fi rms will change their location towards equilibrium). The value of the ratio y p is determined by the following factors
(1) The ratio between const A and const B : the greater this ratio, the larger y P will be. (2) W PE , the relative weight of PE, relative to W PP , the relative weight of PP in the objective function: the larger W PE is in relation to W PP , the greater y P will be at equilibrium. 3) The size of α and β P : the larger α is and the smaller β P is, the higher the value of the y P ratio at equilibrium.
The Social Optimum
Lemma 2. There is market failure in the location of fi rms under free market conditions.
In other words, the ratio y p does not represent a social optimum when we consider all of the benefi ts and costs of the national economy. We therefore claim that such a situation may exist When a fi rm locates in a region, it increases congestion, worsens air pollution and forces the costs of public infrastructure upward, among other things. These are external centrifugal forces that are not expressed in the price mechanism as seen by the private investor. Consequently, the fi rm does not take them into account. We should note that functions PE, PP and PS are cumulative and indicate the effects created by all the fi rms already located in the region. We assume that all of the positive agglomeration effects created by the fi rms already located in the region are taken into consideration by any new fi rm in the process of determining its location preference between regions A and B. However, not all the negative externalities created by the fi rms that are already located in the region are taken into consideration by the new fi rm. Examples of such negative externalities may be pollution or congestion that diminish the utility of the local population.
We defi ne ZS j as the social score of region j. 
> >1
PS reflects the total cost to the economy based on the location of fi rms in a region, in addition to PP (the cost refl ected in the market prices) that includes the cumulative cost of externalities. Actually, from a social point of view, the fi rm should consider the full cost to the economy in its location decision, including the costs refl ected in market prices such as rent and labour, but also including the costs of the externalities not necessarily refl ected in the market prices, such as congestion and pollution. Thus, to achieve efficiency, the optimal location decision should be based on PS and not PP. The addition of social costs (β S > β P ) leads to the result that at any given value of y ZS A < ZP A , so that the social equilibrium y S is lower than the private equilibrium y P as can be seen in Figure 2 . In practical terms, this Figure 2 . Social equilibrium compared with free market equilibrium means that total welfare at the national level (the aggregation of the two regions) could be greater if the share of economic activity in the core region A was less than the one achieved in free market conditions.
Existence of a signifi cant market failure is illustrated in Fig. 2 : the fact that the free private market does not assume social costs leads to an equilibrium that discriminates against the peripheral region.
Government Intervention
We assume that the government's objective is to direct the economy into an optimal spatial structure in terms of maximising total welfare (reaching a social optimum). In fact, the government should reject a strategy of following the free market and adopt a more active one where it directs the market as required by the social optimum (Bar-El and Benhayoun, 2000; Begg, 2002) . The government wants to achieve the equilibrium y S that results from the function ZS A , while the market actually operates under the function of ZP A . As we assume that all location decisions are only made by private entrepreneurs in the free market, the policy measure leading to achievement of optimum y S with the function ZP A is the introduction of changes in the parameters of the function. This can be done in two ways (1) Changing the relative prices (either through subsidies granted in region B or by a tax assessed on locations in region A, such as a congestion tax). (2) Changing const j , for example by public investments in the improvement of infrastructures and labour force quality in region B.
We keep in mind that y P is a stable equilibrium state and, given the initial conditions, any movement will immediately lead to reconvergence to the same point. Therefore, changing the relative prices will not lead to a permanent change in the spatial distribution, but rather to a one-time change for the point in time at which the relative prices were changed. As soon as the change in relative prices by the government stops, equilibrium will immediately return to y P . In contrast, if the government adopts a strategy that changes const j , it will actually induce a permanent and fundamental change in the equilibrium and bring the economy to the optimal point, y S . In this case, governmental intervention in the market will not be required on a regular basis, because it will have created a permanent competitive advantage for region B, the periphery. This is in line with the study conducted by Begg (2002) , who found that the local government needs to subsidise certain projects in areas where it wants to create economic conditions that will provide the given region with a competitive advantage and give the area 'investability' .
The actual implementation of government intervention requires further investigation in another study. Increasing the 'const' term is an oversimplifi ed expression of government intervention. At least two additional perspectives should be considered. First, government intervention has a cost in terms of public expense needed for the increase of the 'const' term. Such expense may justify an optimum equilibrium level between y P and y S . Secondly, the extent of government intervention is primarily evaluated as a function of the values of elasticities α . and β. Higher levels of α and lower levels of β imply greater benefits of concentration at lower costs, therefore decreasing the need for government intervention.
Model Simulation
Before we go into the numeric simulation, we will draw the lines for a comparative static analysis in Table 1 . All the changes are additive: a change in one parameter does not induce a change in the others.
We now carry out a simplifi ed simulation of the model, based on Israeli data (the core region of Tel-Aviv being defi ned as A, and the peripheral region of the south being defi ned as B), to illustrate how it may be implemented. We fi rst make a rapid estimation of the values of the parameters of the model and of the present values of the exogenous variables. In a second phase, we simulate alternative policy measures that would lead to a social optimum and assess their feasibility.
Given the ZP equations (4) and (4a) . In the fi rst phase, we fi nd the gap between y P and y S at the prevailing conditions. In the second phase, we evaluate the changes in the exogenous variables that would lead y P to be equal to y S .
The values used in the simulation process for the various parameters are drawn primarily from rough evaluations, based on past research, excluding the values of the weights W that were estimated on the basis of a questionnaire (see sub-section). We do not intend to elaborate any exact evaluations of the values of the parameters, since our intention is restricted to illustrate implementation of the model. To keep the illustration as close as possible to reality, we decided not to use arbitrary values as examples, but rather to adopt some of the values that were estimated by other researchers, in various other contexts.
Weights W
We use the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method (Saaty, 1980) to estimate the weights of each variable in the location decision. Using a questionnaire with 50 fi rms that recently located in Israel, each firm owner or manager was asked to estimate the relative importance of each location variable, compared with each of the other variables, on a scale of 1-9. The average results are presented in Table 2 .
For example, the agglomeration advantage was evaluated by the respondents as 1.14 times more important than the level of prices of production factors in the region, but only 0.58 times as important as the quality of the regional labour force. The numbers under the diagonal values of 1 are naturally the inverse values of the respective values above the diagonal.
The consistency index (see Saaty, 1980 ) for this matrix is 0.002375 < 0.1, meaning that the answers of the participants are consistent (refl ect transitivity). The relative weights according to this method are added to 1 and are presented in the right-hand column in Table 2 .
Relative Values of the Exogenous Variables
We evaluate now the values of the three exogenous variables-labour force quality (LF), 
infrastructures (INF) and other (OTHER), in the core region in relation to the peripheral region.
Labour force quality (LF).
Relative labour force quality is measured by the distribution of the population in each region by level of education, weighted by the hourly income of the population at each level. The raw data are presented in Table 3 . The quality of the average worker in the core region is 1.176 times greater than that of the average worker in the periphery.
Infrastructure quality (INF).
We use the estimate found by Bar-El (2001) regarding infrastructure elasticity between 1983 and 1998, with respect to labour force (in terms of changes in infrastructure in the region in relation to changes in labour force). The elasticity found for the core region is 0.83, compared with 0.68 in the peripheral region. The relative advantage of the core region is therefore evaluated as 1.221 (the ratio between the two elasticities).
Other (OTHER). The last exogenous variable represents mainly the level of accessibility of the entrepreneur to various services and the proximity to place of residence. This is naturally diffi cult to quantify. We approximated this variable to be 20 per cent greater in the core region than in the periphery. Its value is therefore set at 1.20.
3.3 Parameters α, β P and β β
S
Following the basic assumptions of the model, the parameters α and β are expected to be positive, α being less than 1 and β being more than 1. We assume for these illustration purposes: α = 0.7
As for β S , we use the evaluation made by Pines (1996) for the social costs induced by private investors,in relation to the costs covered in the free market, and assume therefore that β S is 15 per cent more than β S β S = 1.38
Equilibrium at Prevailing Conditions
Solving the equations with the estimated values of the various weights, exogenous variables and parameters, we fi nd the following results for equilibrium y p = 2.36 and y s = 1.98
The value of 2.36 means that the model predicts a level of economic activity in the core region that is 2.36 times that in the peripheral region. If we measure this level by the number of jobs prevailing in each region, we fi nd that the actual relation is not far from this number: 2.20. In practice, we can try to calibrate this model by changing some of the estimated variables or parameters, until we reach the right fi gure. However, since at this stage we are undertaking these simulations solely for the sake of illustration and since the level of economic activity is not defi ned by a clear variable, we keep this result without further elaboration. The result for y S is naturally less and shows that, for the achievement of a social optimum, the gap between economic activity in the core region and in the periphery should be less (1.98 times greater in the core region than in the periphery, instead of 2.36).
Policy Options
As explained earlier, the intervention of the government is designed to create exogenous conditions so that the free market is led to the social optimum, a ratio of 1.98 in our case. We test here two main alternative options of policy measures and a combination of them. Both are based on changes in the exogenous variables that are naturally the responsibility of the public sector: one is the improvement of infrastructure and the other is the improvement of the quality of labour force. We focus on these two policy measures that are generally considered highly important, for purposes of illustration. Naturally, we do not pretend that there are no other instruments: various governments use other measures, such as capital incentives, transfer payments, tax regulations, direct public investments in business ventures and the provision of municipal services. Each of these measures could be used for the evaluation of the model, but we choose to focus our illustration on measures of infrastructure and labour force quality improvement.
Policy of infrastructure improvement. Let us assume that the government tries to solve the market failure by changing the infrastructure gap between the core and the southern area. We try to fi nd the infrastructure gap that leads to the optimal ratio (1.98) under the free market process
Given that the prevailing infrastructure gap was evaluated at 1.221, the required measure is not only to reduce the gap, but also to create a gap in favour of the periphery. This solution may not be feasible: according to the National Long Term Plan (NLTP), the prevailing gaps between the core and the periphery could only be decreased by 50 per cent over a period of 20 years.
Policy of improvement of labour force quality. Let us assume now that the government tries to solve the market failure by changing the labour force gap between the centre and the southern area, to lead to the optimal ratio under the free market process
Given that the gap in labour force quality now stands at 1.176, it follows that the government should diminish the infrastructure gap almost totally. This is also not feasible, especially given the long-term plans as detailed in the NLTP. We are aware of the fact that the results may largely depend on the values of parameters α and β. We tested the sensitivity of our results to changes in the values of both parameters within quite wide ranges: α (0.5-0.9) and β (1.1-1.5). The results for the LF required ) are between 0.9 and 1.09, which means that for all of that range of values for α and β, the one instrument policy is not feasible.
Mixed policy of improvement in infrastructure and labour force. We should keep in mind that, when the government tries to improve one of the exogenous variables (infrastructure and labour force) in the southern region, it will face a diminishing return to scale concurrent with increasing marginal cost. Therefore, lacking any information about the exact behaviour of these variables, it seems most reasonable to improve the infrastructure and the labour force concurrently in the same proportion.
Let us assume that ϕ is the equal rate of improvement of both parameters
The result is: ϕ = 0.49. In other words, the gap in infrastructure and labour force should be reduced by 51 per cent. This solution fi ts the one suggested by the NLTP. The gap between the core region and the peripheral region would therefore reach 1.09 for labour force and 1.108 for infrastructure.
Conclusion
The location of economic activity has been widely analysed in the literature and the addition of the core-periphery model by Krugman and his followers in the new economic geography has contributed signifi cantly to the understanding of this issue. However, most of literature on this subject has dealt with free market considerations, trying to understand the behaviour of fi rms, while the social optimum, taking into consideration the costs and benefi ts to the nation as a whole, has not generally been taken into consideration. As noted in the introduction, there are articles, such as those by Dohse (1998) and Charlot et al. (2006) , which also refer to the gap that may occur between the free market equilibrium and the social optimum. Still, the relationship between the processes that lead to the social optimum and those that lead to the private optimum have not been integrated into one complete model. This is mainly a result of the fact that many of the elements that infl uence the social optimum are not quantifi able or are not readily identifi able.
The modest contribution of this article is in the effort to integrate both the free market and the social considerations into one model. The cost of such an effort is in the necessity to simplify the model, confi ning the analysis to measurable elements of social considerations.
The theoretical simplifi ed model elaborated here shows that free market forces lead to a stable market equilibrium, where the proportion between economic activity in core and peripheral regions reaches y P . We have shown that the optimal equilibrium in social terms is necessarily lower than the one to which the free market leads, meaning that a signifi cant market failure exists in the distribution of fi rms between regions by the free market.
The government role in this case is to lead to the optimal spatial distribution of fi rms by using the mechanism of the free market. The government should lead fi rms to internalise the additional social cost. Given that the free market leads to stable equilibrium in the spatial distribution of fi rms, government intervention is needed to change the equilibrium permanently by infl uencing the regional constants. Instead of the government subsidising specific projects in a manner that cannot change the equilibrium unless the subsidy is permanent, it needs to create a competitive advantage for the periphery and thus achieve the social optimum (new stable equilibrium) through the mechanism of the free market.
The simulation exercise performed here illustrates the implementation of this model for the case of Israel. It also permits evaluation of the feasibility of a policy of government intervention into one of the exogenous policy variables. In the case of Israel, it is shown that the government cannot solve the regional market failure by concentrating on policy instruments and that a combined action for the improvement of both infrastructure and quality of labour force is required.
This article focused on the question of free market versus social optimum, for the sake of simplifi cation leaving many issues still open for further investigation and inclusion in the model. Some of the most acute questions to be solved are briefl y suggested here.
One relates to the behavioural functions. They are all presented in this model in an extremely simplifi ed manner and they may require more detailed elaboration. As an example, the function describing the infl uence of the agglomeration economies may be oversimplifi ed. It is not clear if, in the peripheral region, agglomeration economies are already in effect in the fi rst steps of economic growth, or only after a certain stage has been reached. A more elaborated function would therefore be needed.
Another factor that should be considered and added to complement this model is the element of labour mobility between regions. The hidden (and unrealistic) assumption in our model so far is a lack of labour mobility. It would seem that reducing the cost of mobility between regions might in certain cases widen the gap between the centre and the periphery and increase the market failure. At the same time, however, it may reduce inequality in the distribution of income between the regions by allowing for a broader employment market for the labour force in the periphery. The reduction in mobility cost, if done concurrently with changes of the regional constants may, on the other hand, increase the attraction of economic activity to the periphery.
Another important factor needed to complement this model, as mentioned, is the cost of government intervention. Governmental intervention, even if it resolves the market failure, is not necessarily worthwhile as long as it is subject to cost-benefi t considerations. It seems that adding public cost-benefit considerations would lead to a lower gap between market and social optimum.
